Dissociative identity disorder is widely framed as a disorder of “multiple identities”, characterized by “alters” that are conceptualized as distinct, personified selves within one body. This model, reinforced by the DSM-5, media, and community narratives, imposes a cultural lens on what is fundamentally a disorder of detachment and, more influentially, compartmentalization. The assumption that DID necessarily involves the presence of “alters” reflects an applied interpretation of dissociation rather than an inherent truth of the disorder itself. The diagnostic framework privileges identity fragmentation as the defining feature, yet this is neither a universal experience nor the most precise way to understand the phenomenon of dissociation.
The DSM-5 defines DID as a “disruption of identity characterized by two or more distinct personality states”, reinforcing a model that assumes identity itself is the core issue rather than the structural integrity of memory, affect, and self-experience. By framing DID in terms of fragmented identities, the diagnosis does not merely describe dissociation—it actively shapes how individuals conceptualize their own experience. Someone diagnosed with DID, even if they do not initially perceive themselves as “multiple” or “plural”, may come to do so because the diagnostic label constructs the reality it claims to describe. This process, known as the looping effect, reinforces the culturally dominant model of DID rather than presenting a neutral, agnostic framework that accommodates a broader range of dissociative experiences.
DID is more accurately conceptualized as a disorder of compartmentalization rather than a disorder of identity. Compartmentalization captures the essential mechanism underlying the disorder: the rigid separation of memory, emotion, and self-experience that results in barriers to conscious awareness. Unlike the identity-based model, which is shaped by cultural and psychiatric narratives, the concept of compartmentalization remains as agnostic to interpretation as possible. Conceptualizing DID as fundamentally about compartmentalization describes the structural nature of dissociation itself. Those diagnosed with it are then free to interpret how this compartmentalization manifests in their life—whether through personified identities, discrete compartmentalized internal states, or disruptions in memory and self-continuity—without the diagnosis imposing a particular framework onto their experience.
Identity fragmentation is an applied interpretation of compartmentalization. The dominant model of DID assumes that compartmentalization results in “multiple identities”, but this is an interpretive layer placed on top of the underlying dissociative structure. Compartmentalization describes the core dissociative process: the rigid separation of memory, emotion, and self-experience. Identity fragmentation is a possible outcome of compartmentalization, but compartmentalization does not necessitate identity fragmentation. A person can experience extreme dissociative compartmentalization—such as amnesia, shifts in cognitive abilities, or changes in affect—without interpreting these experiences as distinct identities. Compartmentalization captures identity fragmentation within its broader framework, but identity fragmentation alone does not fully encapsulate the complexity of compartmentalization.
I have found that psychoanalytic interpretations of dissociative phenomena are generally more agnostic to cultural interpretations. Specifically, Philip Bromberg’s work in “Standing in the Spaces” offers a useful lens through which to understand dissociation without the imposed framework of identity fragmentation. He proposes that all individuals shift between different self-states, but in DID, these states remain rigidly dissociated rather than fluid. The central issue is not the presence of multiple selves but the inability to integrate dissociative states into a cohesive experience of self. In this understanding, then, healing does not require “fusing” alters but rather reducing the psychological need for compartmentalization in the first place. This perspective moves away from the idea of discrete personalities and instead focuses on the restoration of continuity in self-awareness.
I do not have “alters”. I experience extreme internal compartmentalization, where different facets of my life remain rigidly separated. I have a discontinuous internal experience. But I do not personify these compartmentalized internal states. Personification is a choice, and I choose not to engage in it. My experience is not radically different from that of others diagnosed with DID; rather, I interpret my internal experiences through a different lens than the dominant narrative suggests. If you have DID, you do not need to personify your internal states. Choosing to do so reflects participation in a culturally influenced interpretation of dissociation rather than an inherent feature of the disorder itself.
Finally, I do not claim that the experience of identity fragmentation is consciously chosen. Rather, the way we interpret dissociation is shaped by the frameworks available to us. Some people experience their compartmentalization as distinct, personified selves, while others do not. The critical distinction is that these interpretations are not intrinsic to DID itself but emerge through cultural meaning-making.
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